The Nature and the Extent of the Market for Technology in Biopharmaceuticals by Arora, Ashish et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Nature and the Extent of the Market
for Technology in Biopharmaceuticals
Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella and Fabio Pammolli
and Massimo Riccaboni
IMT Institute For Advanced Studies, Lucca
December 2000
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15977/
MPRA Paper No. 15977, posted 1. July 2009 09:17 UTC
THE NATURE AND THE EXTENT OF THE MARKET FOR 
TECHNOLOGY IN BIOPHARMACEUTICALS 
 
 
Ashish Arora 
Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 
ashish@andrew.cmu.edu 
 
Alfonso Gambardella 
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy 
agambardella@info-net.it 
 
Fabio Pammolli 
University of Siena, Italy 
pammolli@cln.it 
 
Massimo Riccaboni 
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy,  
and University of Siena, Italy 
riccaboni.massimo@libero.it 
 
 
 
 
December 2000 
 
 
This paper is part of the activities of the EPRIS Project (European Pharmaceutical 
Regulation & Innovation Systems), University of Siena, Italy.  We also acknowledge 
financial support from the CNRS Program “Les Enjeux Economique de l’Innovation”.  
The paper benefitted from comments and suggestions of the participants in the 
International Conference on “Technology Policy and Innovation: Economic and 
Historical Perspectives”, Paris, Maison de la Chimie, Centre International de Congres, 
20-22 November 2000, and in the EPRIS Annual Meeting, London 15-16 December, 
2000.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Abstract  
 
This paper explored an unusually comprehensive dataset of more than 2,000 drug R&D 
projects all over the world during the 1990s.  This enabled us to characterise several 
features of the innovation process in pharmaceuticals, particularly the different role and 
comparative R&D performance of the large established drug companies vis-à-vis 
smaller high-tech specialist firms  the so-called New Biotechnology Firms (NBFs).  
Our results can be summarised as follows: 
 
a) The NBFs are largely an American phenomenon.  More than half of the drug R&D 
projects originated in the US are by NBFs, while almost 90% of the drug R&D 
projects originated in Europe are from established pharmaceutical firms; 
 
b) Collaborative R&D projects are consistently more likely to occur in the US than in 
Europe.  However, in-house projects are a significant majority of the drug R&D 
projects that entered the clinical stages.   
 
c) The established pharmaceutical companies have comparative advantages with 
respect to the NBFs in drug development (clinical trials).  In drug discovery there is 
no advantage related to scale.  Unlike clinical developments, where the large firms 
seem to have superior capabilities when compared to the NBFs, in discovery there is 
no inherent superiority (in terms of ultimate probability of success of the 
compounds) of either the NBFs or the large firms.  
 
d) The NBFs are not specialized in more risky R&D projects.  In fact, more risky drug 
projects (i.e. drugs for which there is no or there are few existing remedies) are more 
likely to be undertaken by the larger pharmaceutical companies.  This suggests that 
scale, market power, and the ability to moblise large amounts of resources are key 
factors in enabling the firms to sustain such higher risks. 
 
e) Other things being equal, the projects originated by the NBFs are more likely to fail 
in the earlier clinical stages.  This suggests that the NBFs perform a good deal of 
exploration without incurring the higher costs of failing at later stages.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Technological collaborations, R&D agreements, licensing and the exchange of 
technology among independent parties have become common phenomena in recent 
years.  (See for instance Teece, 1986; Kogut, 1988; Hagedoorn, 1992; Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994.)  In many industries, and particularly in many high-tech industries, 
one observes the rise of smaller high-tech firms whose main competence is technology.  
Typically, these firms supply their technologies through licensing or more elaborated 
forms of collaboration within full fledged “markets for technology”. (Arora, Fosfuri, 
and Gambardella, 2000.)   As argued by Gans, Hsu and Stern (2000), when 
technological appropriability is strong, these firms tend to act as specialized technology 
suppliers to the larger established firms which operate in the downstream markets.  
When technological appropriability is weaker, they tend to appropriate rents from their 
mastery of the technology by moving downstream, and by competing with the 
established firms.  
 
Biopharmaceuticals is a quintessential example of the development of technological 
collaborations, as well as of technological competition, between larger established 
firms, and a set of new, smaller firms specialized in technology.  The story of the New 
Biotechnology Firms (NBFs) has been told by several authors (e.g. among others, 
Orsenigo, 1989; Gambardella, 1995).  After the foundation of Genentech in 1976, a 
wave of NBFs were founded in the 1980s, and many others have been founded during 
the 1990s.  The NBFs are specialized in the early stages of drug R&D.  Their 
comparative advantage is in the application of the new biological technologies and the 
life sciences to drug discovery, and to other areas like agricultural chemicals, food, 
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environment, etc..  In pharmaceuticals, the NBFs often lack the resources to conduct the 
far more costly clinical trials to obtain the market approval for their new compounds.  
They also have a comparative disadvantage in large scale commercialization of the new 
drugs.   Clearly, the large firms, and especially the large drug multinationals, keep 
significant in-house scientific and technological expertise.  However, the NBFs often 
represent a useful source of new compounds and more generally of external 
technological and scientific competences. 
 
The story of the NBFs raises several questions.  Particularly, we lack a systematic 
assessment of issues like  What are the main characteristics and comparative 
advantages of the larger and smaller firms in the innovation process?  Do the larger 
firms have comparative advantages in downstream R&D activities, while the smaller 
firms have comparative advantages in upstream research because of their more suitable 
organizational structures and systems of incentives (e.g. Arrow, 1983; March and 
Levinthal, 1993)?  Are the smaller high-tech firms taking up more risky projects (e.g. 
Arrow, 1983; Holmstrom, 1989)?  Are the smaller firms providing a greater deal of 
“exploration” by initiating several new projects which tend to end up earlier, thereby 
avoiding more costly failures at later R&D stages?  Since the life sciences are said to 
offer a more scientific approach to drug discovery, potential failures can be detected 
earlier because of the better understanding of the underlying process.  One may then 
expect that the projects of the NBFs, which are more specialized in the life sciences, fail 
earlier, with implied cost savings from avoiding later failures.  Another question is 
whether collaborative and in-house R&D projects exhibit different probabilities of 
success.  As we shall discuss in the paper, there are reasons in favour of either one of 
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the two R&D governance structures, and the only empirical study we know on this issue 
found that internally developed compounds are more likely to succeed (Pisano, 1997). 
 
This paper employs a comprehensive database of drug R&D projects all over the world 
during the 1990s.  Our sample includes projects that entered at least the first stage of the 
clinical trials (clinicals I).  The database reports systematic information about such 
projects, like the therapeutic class of the compound which is being tried; the stage 
(clinicals I, II, III) in which the project failed, or whether it was eventually approved for 
commercialization; the company that originated the compound, and the one that 
developed it (which will be the same company in the case of in-house projects); the 
R&D stage (clinicals I, II, III) in which the compound was licensed; the country in 
which the trials were conducted, and in which the compound was approved.  As we 
shall discuss in the next section we used only the projects which were terminated (either 
that failed or that ended up successfully).  Our sample is then composed of 2078 
projects.  The main goal of the paper is then to exploit the potential of our database to 
provide a systematic and comprehensive assessment of the technological collaborations 
in this industry, the role and the comparative advantages of the smaller high-tech NBFs 
vis-à-vis the established pharmaceutical companies, along with other aspects of the 
nature and the organization of the innovation process in this sector. 
 
Of course, biopharmaceuticals is peculiar in that, compared to other high-tech 
industries, its R&D activities unfold “linearly” from discovery to the various clinical 
tests.  This helps our empirical analysis as it avoid the complications associated with the 
far more convoluted   or “chain-linked”, as Kline and Rosenberg (1986) put it  R&D 
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processes of industries like electronics.  Here, for example, we can distinguish fairly 
neatly between an early, upstream research stage and the downstream ones.  However, 
the very fact that in this industry we can naturally separate features like the upstream vs 
downstream R&D stages, or the activities that different types of firms (e.g. large and 
small) do, suggests that it may provide a meaningful perspective to evaluate more 
generally the nature of these processes.  For example, questions like whether or not 
biotech firms perform more risky projects, or whether they are specialized in upstream 
research, or about the nature of the in-house vs licensing process and the potential 
differences in their probability of success, can be informative about similar processes in 
other industries. 
 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents our database, and it 
discusses our sample of projects.  Sections 3-8 empirically assess various issues about 
technological collaborations in the pharmaceutical industry.  Section 3 looks at the share 
of compounds developed in collaboration vs those developed internally by the firms, 
and the role of the NBFs and the larger firms.  Section 4 examines whether the NBFs 
originate more risky technological projects.  Section 5 tests the differences in the 
probability of success of the licensed vs in-house compounds.  Section 6 and 7 assess 
the comparative advantages in upstream research and in drug development of the NBFs 
and the larger firms.  Section 8 examines whether the NBFs projects that failed, tend to 
fail at earlier research stages.  As noted, this may be a consequence of the more 
scientific content of the technology in which the NBFs are specialized.  The concluding 
section summarizes the overall picture about the nature of the drug R&D process that 
emerges from our analysis, along with the differential features of the firms involved.  
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The Appendix develops further details about our results, and particularly about the 
R&D specializations of the larger and the smaller innovators in our sample. 
 
 
2. THE SAMPLE OF DRUG R&D PROJECTS 
Our sample is drawn from the Pharmaceutical Industry Database (PHID) built at the 
University of Siena.  PHID combines several sector-specific proprietary datasets about 
R&D activity, collaboration and final drug markets with data from public sources as 
well as companies confidential information and press releases.  PHID covers 11418 
R&D projects developed by 2262 organizations including: 427 pharmaceutical 
companies1,1222 biotech firms2 and 613 universities and other public and private 
research centers between 1989 and 1999.  Twenty-two percent of all the projects in our 
database were developed in collaboration by two or more partners.  
 
For each R&D project, the database provides the following information: 
1) Originator. Firm/institution that launched the R&D project on a new chemical 
compound with potential pharmacological activity (or known chemical compounds 
for different pharmacological targets). Typically, it is the holder of the patent on the 
new compound (or the new indication). 
2) Developer. Firm/institution that developed the project. This is the same as the 
Originator for the in-house projects.  For the licensed compounds, the Developer is 
                                                          
1 Subsidiaries, divisions and research laboratories of  pharmaceutical firms are included.  For each project 
of these subunits our database reports the ultimate parent company. 
2 We defined biotech companies to be all the companies in our database that were founded after 1976 (the 
year in which the first biotech company, Genentech, was founded) and that were originators of projects in 
the database that applied biotechnological methodologies to the discovery and development of new drugs.  
We also checked our database to avoid that joint-ventures among larger established companies fell into 
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the licensee who is entitled to develop it further. Frequently the relationship between 
Originators and Developers is not just a pure licensing contract.  In 67% of the cases 
it amounts to an R&D collaboration with fairly complex contractual and 
organizational settings.  Moreover, 12% of the collaborations are between one 
Originator and many Developers.  In these cases we considered different projects for 
different Developers.3  
3) Therapeutic Categories: Projects have been classified according to their targets in 
terms of likely therapeutic markets.  We adopted the ATC (Anatomic Therapeutic 
Classification) at the 3rd digit level.  For example, HIV-antiviral correspond to the 
ATC3 class J5C.4 
4) Pharmacological  Actions: The main pharmacological activity of the compounds is 
described in standard terms.  Back to the HIV-antivirals example, we can discern 
proteinase inhibitors from reverse transcriptase inhibitors and other products with 
different biological targets. 
5) Development History: The PHID database monitors the whole development history 
of the projects starting form the patenting date of the compound (priority and issue),  
through preclinical and clinical development stages (I, II, III), to registration and 
final launch on the market.  For unsuccessful projects it registered the stage in which 
they have been discontinued.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
this category.  After inspecting our sample, we were confident that this criterion enabled us to single out 
the NBFs.  
3 These are non-exclusive licensing contracts in which the Originator typically licenses the compounds to 
several Developers who test it for different indications/pathologies.  The testing of the same compound 
for different indications/pathologies also justifies the fact that we treat them as different projects.  
4 The Anatomical Classification of Pharmaceutical Products has been developed and maintained by the 
European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research Association (EphMRA) starting from 1971. A 
Classification Committee has been constituted to takes care for new entries, changes and improvements. 
The 1st level of the Anatomic Therapeutic Classification indicates the anatomical main group (C – 
Cardiovascular System). The 2nd level identifies the main therapeutic groups (C1 – Cardiac Therapy). 
Finally, the 3rd level separates out the pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups (C1B – Anti-Arrhythmics). 
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6) Collaborations and licensing activity: For the licensed compounds, PHID records the 
development stage (clinicals I, II, or III) at which the collaboration agreement was 
signed, and the type of collaboration that was specified by the parties.  
7) Country of  clinical trials:  PHID also reports the countries in which the clinical trials 
were conducted, and for the successful projects those in which the products were 
approved.  As we shall see below, we only look at the projects in which the 
Developer is a US or European company.  In the vast majority of cases, the 
companies from these regions run the clinical trials and obtained approvals in their 
home country as well.  We then took the home country of the company as the 
country of the trials.5  
 
Moreover, for the companies included in our database we collected information about: 
(a) year of founding; (b) nationality; (c) number of employees; (d) total revenues (health 
and consolidated); (e) R&D expenditures (health and consolidated); (f) sales in seven 
countries (USA, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Spain and Italy). 
 
For the purposes of this paper we extracted from PHID a specific sample.  First, we 
disregarded all the projects that had not yet reached the clinical trials. Firms may differ 
in their definition of an in-house projects, and they may have different attitudes about 
releasing news about their internal R&D activities.  By contrasts, when they enter the 
clinical trials, the information about projects is registered and becomes public domain.  
This also entails a fairly standard definition of what constitutes a drug R&D project.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
The 3rd ATC level is a widely accepted standard  (applied for instance by Antitrust authorities around the 
world) to classify products for purposes of identifying the manufacturing market in pharmaceuticals. 
 
7 
 
 
 
 Second, our sample is composed of all the projects that were terminated.  These are all 
the projects in the database for which we know that the compound was either 
successfully approved for marketing, or it was discontinued at clinicals I, II, or III.  The 
database does not tell us whether the project actually failed.  However, managers in the 
pharmaceutical industry told us that it is rare that a project that passed some clinical test 
was not moved to the next stage.  This rules out that projects may overcome some 
clinical tests but were discontinued because of the lack of funds to conduct the later 
clinical trials. Relatedly, it rules out cases of strategic behavior on the part of the 
pharmaceutical companies, which may choose not to enter a later trial because they 
have reasons to believe that the compound may fail at the later stages  viz. the 
expected value of the next trial is not worth its costs, in spite of the fact that the 
compound passed the earlier stage.  In short, the compounds that were discontinued can 
be treated as genuine failures at that stage of the clinical tests.6  
 
Third, we restricted our sample to the projects whose trials were conducted in the US or 
in one of the 15 countries of the European Union plus Switzerland and Norway.  When 
we selected only the leading European countries, notably the UK, France and Germany, 
the differences in our empirical results were marginal.  Moreover, as we shall see, our 
results are fairly similar when we restrict our analysis to trials in the US by the US 
firms.   We also confined our sample to projects in which the firm developing the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 In few cases the home country of the company was not one in which the firm run the clinical trials.  In 
these cases, we assigned the nationality of the trials to be the US if there were US trials or US approval, 
or Europe if there were trials or approval in one of the European countries and not the US.  
6 Pisano (1997) also ruled out from his sample all the projects that were not terminated.  
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compound is from the US, one of the Europe-15 countries, Switzerland or Norway.  By 
this, we mean companies with their headquarter in one of these countries.  
 
The reason why we did not include trials conducted in other countries is that the 
European and US trials are likely to be more stringent.  This prompted us to eliminate 
the companies from the other countries.  The higher costs of international trials for these 
companies may prompt them to try in the US or Europe only their best compounds, with 
implied upward bias in their probability of success.  We noted that Japanese companies 
received many international licenses which were probably licenses for compounds that 
were already commercialised elsewhere.  These were unlikely to be genuine new 
compounds.  To avoid this and related biases we chose to eliminate Japanese companies 
(and the Japanese trials) altogether.  We also excluded all the projects licensed by the 
established pharmaceutical companies to other companies.  Since it is unlikely that an 
established pharmaceutical firm licenses a product to another firm without 
commercializing it itself, these are probably not new R&D projects.  Most likely, these 
are projects developed earlier by the licensor, and then tried again, possibly in his home 
country, by the licensee. Therefore, all the licensed compounds in our sample come 
either from universities or from NBFs.  In addition, we carefully inspected all the 
remaining collaborations in our sample to verify their genuine R&D content.  Our final 
sample is composed of 2078 projects. 
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3. THE NBFs AS AN AMERICAN PHENOMENON 
It is typically argued from several accounts of this industry that the NBFs are largely an 
American phenomenon.  Our analysis begins by checking the prevalence of the NBFs in 
the US market, and the extent of the difference between the US and Europe in this 
matter. 
 
Table 1 reports the percentage of projects in our sample originated by established 
pharmaceutical companies, NBFs, and universities.  The Table also reports the 
percentage of licensed projects over the total projects in the sample, and the percentage 
of successful projects, which gives an idea of the orders of magnitude of the 
unconditional probabilities of success in our sample. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Table distinguishes between projects developed by US-based companies in the US 
(i.e. trials conducted in the US), and projects developed by European-based companies 
in Europe (trials in Europe).  The reason why we restricted to projects developed by the 
companies in their own regions is the one mentioned earlier that companies may 
develop in other countries only the compounds with higher expected value.  However, 
we also tried several other cases (viz. trials by any company in the US or in Europe, as 
well as the full sample).  The picture that emerges is basically the one offered by the 
present Table.  For example, we found that the European-based companies normally 
develop their compounds in Europe, and similarly for the US companies.  Since our 
data focus on the projects that were first developed somewhere, this suggests that, as 
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expected, the companies from either regions first develop their compounds in their own 
region.  This also implied that we only added few observations when we looked at the 
projects by European or US companies in the US, as compared to the US trials by the 
US firms only, and similarly for the European case. 
 
The Table shows that there are many more projects originatd by the NBFs in the US 
than in Europe, and there are many more US than European NBFs.  If we look at the 
first column of Table 1 (US trials by US firms), more than half of the projects were 
originated by the NBFs, compared to 11.5% of the projects in Europe.  As noted earlier, 
the difference in the percentages does not change if one conditions only on whether the 
companies are US or European (wherever they do the trials), or on whether the trials are 
conducted in the US or Europe. 
 
Probably as a consequence of the larger presence of NBFs in the US market, the share 
of licensed projects is higher in the US (or in the case of the US companies).  Overall 
however, the percentage of licensed compounds is small  7.5% in the US and 2.1% in 
Europe.  One could argue that companies may record as internally developed 
compounds any sort of “small” projects that they have launched or that they may even 
have just in their mind, or in the mind of their scientists.  By contrast, a compound that 
was developed through a formal collaboration is likely to be a more sizable and realistic 
project.  As discussed earlier, our database is composed however, of projects that 
entered at least clinicals I.   This means that they are all projects of some scale and 
magnitude, which cannot be mere ideas.  As a result, the percentages shown in the Table 
may be genuine shares of the two types of projects. 
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 From inspecting our data, we also noted that the share of projects in collaborations has 
increased significantly for projects launched after the mid-1990s.  Many of these 
projects are not in our sample because they have not been terminated.  The percentage 
of projects in collaborations over the total number of projects still under development is 
higher (19.95%).  This suggests that the importance of technological collaborations and 
the market for technology might have increased in the 1990s, as also argued elsewhere 
for this and other industries (Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella, 2000).   Finally, Table 1 
shows that the probability of success for a compound that enters clinicals I is of the 
order of 10%.  
 
 
4. “RISKY” PROJECTS 
It has been argued that smaller high-tech firms have a greater propensity to undertake 
more risky technological projects.  For one reason, their informal and less hierarchical 
organizational structures favor the development of new ideas.  Similarly, their internal 
incentive system is more likely to induce risky ventures than the hierarchical structure 
of the larger firms. 
 
We asked a pharmacologist to rank the 3-digit ATC class assigned to the projects in 
terms of their degree of risk.7  At the 3-digit level, therapeutic classes reflects quite 
closely to the basic degree of risk and innovativeness of the compounds.  For each new 
product the ATC Scientific Committee decides if it can be classified in a class that 
already exists.  If not, new groups/classes are created for new markets for which these 
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products are indicated.  It is possible to identify according to standard pharmacological 
criteria the classes with a higher innovativeness content.  Specifically, our 
pharmacologist ranked the 3-digit therapeutic class of the projects in our sample on a 0-
5 scale.  She assigned 0-1 to therapeutic classes that concern pathologies that are fairly 
well known and for which there are quite a few existing remedies on the market; 2-3 
were assigned to therapeutic classes in which the pathology was less well known, and 
for which there are few remedies on the market; 4-5 cover therapeutic classes in which 
the pathologies are largely unknown, and there are very few or no remedies (e.g. 
Alzheimer). 
 
Moreover, since there are projects that span more than one therapeutic class, we took 
the average score of the classes assigned to the project, and associated that average 
value to it.  In order to keep a fair number of projects per class of risk, we grouped our 
risk classes in three main categories.  We defined R1 to be our low risk class.  This 
includes all the projects with original score between 0 and 1.68; R2 is the intermediate 
risk class, for projects whose original score was between 1.68 and 3.34; R3 is the high 
risk class, for projects whose original score was between 3.34 and 5.  As a check for the 
validity of our classification, we computed the mean probability of success of our 
projects in the three classes.  When considering only the projects developed by the US 
firms from clinical trials in the US, the expected probability of success for R1, R2, and 
R3 projects are respectively 15%, 9%, and 4%; for projects developed by the European 
firms in Europe, they are 15%, 12%, and 7%.  This suggests that our risk classes do 
capture the lower probability of success of taking R&D projects to completion as one 
moves from R1 to R3. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 There are 193 3-digit ATC classes in our sample of projects.  
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 To assess the propensity of different types of agents to launch risky project, we report 
the cross-tabulation of the number of projects in classes R1, R2 and R3 originated by 
the NBFs, the established pharmaceutical companies and the universities.  Table 2 
employs the sample of projects in which the developer is a US firm in the US.  Since 
most of the NBFs are from the US, this ruled out potential biases due to international 
projects.  For comparison, Table 3 reports the same data for the full sample.   
 
TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The interesting result of Tables 2 and 3 is that the NBFs launch relatively more projects 
in R1 than in R2 and R3, while the larger firms (and the universities) originate 
comparatively more projects in R2 and R3.  This is true both in Table 2 (US firms doing 
trials in the US) and 3 (full sample). Using the data in Table 2, the shares of R1, R2, and 
R3 projects originated by NBFs are respectively 68.7%, 56.4%, and 45.7%.  By 
contrast, the shares of R1, R2, and R3 projects originated by a large company or a 
university are: 27.6%, 37.4%, 48.6%, and 3.7%, 6.3%, 5.8%. 
 
This result contradicts the view that smaller high-tech firms undertake relatively more 
risky R&D, and do more exploration in less known technological territories.  It also 
confirms the point made quite a few years ago by Schwartzman (1976) that the large 
companies are the more typical vehicle for conducting risky R&D in the drug industry.  
Put differently, these results confirm that the capability of sustaining high levels of 
technological risk, such as the one that is necessary to cope with major pathologies with 
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no existing remedies, are more likely to be borne by larger companies with established 
financial assets and commercialization capabilities.  At the same time, these results 
suggest that what the NBFs are more typically doing is to produce existing remedies 
using the new biological technologies.  They do not tap risky business, but they 
typically use their expertise in the new technology to tap a market with relatively little 
risk (e.g. diagnostic kits, rare pathologies, etc.).8  
 
 
5. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS: LICENSED VS. IN-HOUSE PROJECTS 
Are the licensed compounds more likely to be successful than the internally developed 
compounds?  There are reasons for arguing both ways.  For example, Pisano (1997) 
maintained that in the case of licensed compounds there could be a classical “lemon” 
problem.  Asymmetric information implies that the licensor is more informed about the 
potential of her license.  The licensees know this, and if there is no way in which the 
“good” licensors can distinguish themselves from the “bad” ones, the licensees are only 
willing to pay license fees that are equal to the expected value between the value of a 
potentially good compound and that of a potentially bad one.  But this means that the 
licensors of good compounds do not realize the value of their license, while the 
licensors of bad compounds enjoy an extra rent.  As a result, it is likely than on the 
market one observes a greater share of lemons than in the universe of projects as whole. 
Pisano tests this hypothesis by checking whether the licensed compounds have a lower 
probability of success than internally developed ones.  By using data on about 300 drug 
                                                          
8 See the Appendix for further details about the specializations of the NBFs and the larger firms in these 
areas of activity.  
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R&D projects he finds that internally developed projects have a higher probability of 
success than projects developed in collaboration with other parties.  
 
But transaction costs may work the other way as well.  For example, due to asymmetric 
information or other imperfections in the market for technology, licensed compounds 
have higher costs than internally developed ones.  The higher costs are shared by the 
licensor and licensee.  As a result, the expected value of the licensed compound must be 
higher than an equivalent in-house drug.  Since we do not have a good measures for 
assessing the market size of the drug candidates, we test the hypothesis that licensed 
compounds have a higher probability of success.  Another argument is that the licensed 
compounds have higher probability of success because of the higher efficiency of the 
R&D process when associated with an effective vertical specialization in the drug 
innovation process.  As suggested earlier, the NBFs can be more efficient in the 
discovery stages.  If so, the compounds licensed by the NBFs (or the universities) are 
more likely to succeed.  
 
When comparing the probability of success of in-house vs licensed compounds, one also 
needs to compare the right conditional probabilities.  Compounds licensed at a given 
clinical stage have passed the earlier stages.  Their probability of success is then the 
probability of success conditional on the fact that they passed such earlier stages.  As a 
result, they should be compared with in-house projects conditional upon the fact that 
they have overcome the same earlier stages.  Since our data provide the information 
about the stage at which the licensed compounds were licensed, we could compute the 
probability of success for compounds licensed at clinicals I, II and III.  Since clinicals I 
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is the basic clinical stage at which the projects in our sample were recorded, we 
compared the probability of success of the compounds licensed in clinicals I with the 
probability of success of the internally developed compounds in our sample.  We then 
compared the probability of success of the compounds licensed in clinicals II with the 
in-house compounds that passed the clinicals I stage.  Similarly, we compared the 
compounds licensed in clinicals III with the internally developed compounds that 
passed clinicals II. 
 
The results are in Table 4.  As we did earlier, we show both the results for the US 
companies running US trials, and those obtained using the full sample.  The two 
samples show no qualitative difference in the results.  Also, to avoid any potential bias 
in the data, the sample used in this and the next sections does not include the 
compounds developed by the universities (but it still includes compounds originated by 
universities and licensed to companies).  This reduces our full sample from 2078 to 
2036 projects.9  
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 4 shows that the probability of success of the licensed compounds is 
systematically higher than that of the internally developed compounds.  This contradicts 
the earlier finding by Pisano (1997) that licensed compounds are more likely to be 
lemons.  By contrast, it suggests that either licensed compounds need to have a higher 
expected value to overcome transaction costs, or that licensed compounds are originated 
                                                          
9 Since in the earlier section we were focusing on the originator capabilities there was no need for 
eliminating the projects developed by the universities. 
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by companies that are more efficient in the earlier stages.  In section 7 below, we show 
that the NBFs are not necessarily more efficient originators than the established 
companies (apart from possibly in class of risk R1).  This suggests that it is transaction 
costs that makes licensed compounds more likely to be successful. 
 
The Table also shows that the difference in the probability of success between licensed 
and internally developed compounds is quite pronounced.10   While one cannot exclude 
that our sample is biased in favor of the collaborative projects, this evidence would be 
consistent with the view that licensed compounds entail rather substantial transaction 
costs.  As a matter of fact, the manger of an important US drug manufacturer told us 
that:  
 
“In my experience we are very discriminating when it comes to choosing in-licensing 
partners, because the deal typically involves royalties on sales (therefore sharing the 
profits, while assuming almost all the development risks). With the inhouse compounds, 
we assume the same risks (resource requirements to develop compounds), but are assured 
that the profits are not shared.”  
 
First, this suggests that apart from asymmetric information and the like, such 
collaborative deals may entail long negotiations before they are concluded.  More 
importantly, as our manager points out, the resource requirements that are necessary to 
develop a licensed drugs may not be substantially different from those of an in-house 
project.   As the licensees have to share profits while still incurring the bulk of the R&D 
                                                          
10 We also compared the average probability of success of the in-house compounds with that of the whole 
set of licensed compounds irrespective of the stage in which they were licensed.  The probability of 
success in the case of licensing was still higher, and the differences were similar to those shown in Table 
4.   
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costs, the expected value of the deal has to be sufficiently high compared to an in-house 
projects.  Given the potential market size of the compound, the higher expected returns 
are enhanced only if the probability of success of the in-licensed drugs is rather high.  
Note that the latter argument does not stem from transaction costs, but from the very 
fact that the licensee has to share the rents while incurring the bulk of the R&D costs in 
any case.  Thus, the need for being discriminating in the licensing process, which may 
imply long search processes and negotiations (transaction costs), along with revenue 
sharing, can make the sample of licensed projects a highly selected one, with related 
implications for the probability of success.  
 
6. ASSESSING DEVELOPMENT CAPABILITIES 
Different types of companies may have different comparative advantages in different 
stages of the innovation process.  Most typically, the larger companies may have greater 
comparative advantages in downstream innovation development compared to upstream 
innovation activities.  This is because downstream development activities are more 
likely to rely on scale and experimentation, and this favors companies that can mobilize 
enough resources for these purposes.  By contrast, the flexible organisation of the 
smaller firms may be more suitable to enhance creativity, which is a key asset for the 
early stages of the research process.  In this and the next section we test for the 
comparative advantages of the larger pharmaceutical firms and the NBFs in different 
stages of the drug innovation process.   
 
In this section we focus on the development capabilities.  In order to do so however, we 
cannot simply look at our sample of projects.  This is because, for in-house projects, the 
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probability of success of the compounds may be affected by the upstream capabilities of 
our companies, and this implies that we cannot disentangle their specific downstream 
capabilities.  We focus on the licensed compounds.  We argue that when the compounds 
are licensed, the “originator” capabilities are with the licensor.  If development 
capabilities did not matter, we ought to observe that different companies would not have 
different probabilities of success once the compound is licensed.  By contrast, if for 
licensed compounds there are differences in the probability of success, they can be 
attributed to differences in development capabilities. 
 
We tested for such differences between the large pharma companies on the one hand, 
and the NBFs on the other.  If the originator capabilities are assumed to be with the 
licensors, any remaining difference between NBFs and larger companies as licensees 
ought to be attributed to differences in development capabilities.  Although we could do 
so in principle, we did not test for differences among developers of different 
nationalities (e.g. European and US firms).  As noted earlier, this is because of the 
potential bias in the types of compounds that the companies of the two region develop 
in the other region.11  
 
Table 5 reports probit estimations in which the dependent variable is whether the 
compounds were successfully marketed or not.  The sample is composed of all the 
licensed compounds, and we run two separate regressions for the US companies running 
trials in the US and for the whole sample.  Apart from risk class dummies (and a 
dummy for US trials in the full sample probit), we use a dummy for whether the 
                                                          
11 As a matter of fact, we did find that the compounds of the European companies developed in the US 
have higher probability of success, and the same for the compounds developed by the US firms in Europe. 
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company is a large pharmaceutical company rather than an NBF.  The Table reports 
both the estimated probit parameters and the implied changes in the probability of 
success.   
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 shows that the large pharmaceutical companies are better developers.  The 
result is statistically significant.  Other things being equal, for trials conducted by the 
US companies in the US, the probability of success when the licensee is an established 
pharmaceutical firm is about 25% higher than an NBF.  The result is similar for the full 
sample, although the difference in probability is smaller (15%).  
 
 
7. ASSESSING THE ORIGINATORS CAPABILITIES 
To assess the originators capabilities, we run probit regressions with the dummy for 
successful projects as our dependent variable.  Table 6 reports the results of four sets of 
probit regressions.  The first two regressions use only the sample of projects developed 
by the US companies in the US, while the latter two use the full sample.  In each of the 
two sets of regressions, the second regression eliminates projects originated by the 
universities to focus on the comparison between large pharmaceutical firms and the 
NBFs.12   The probit regressions include dummies for risk classes, and the full sample 
regressions include a dummy for clinical trials in the US.  The Table shows both the 
estimated probit parameters and the implied changes in probability. 
                                                          
12 The projects developed by the universities were eliminate altogether earlier  see section 5 above. 
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 TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The key result of Table 6 is that as originators, the NBFs are no better than the 
established pharmaceutical firms.  Compounds with NBF as Originators have a mere 
0.01 or 0.02 difference in probability of success compared to compounds originated by 
the larger firms, and this difference is not statistically significant.   By contrast, the 
compounds originated by the universities have a statistically significant difference in 
probability of about 0.13.  The latter result probably reflects the fact that the universities 
do not have the type of organization and resources that are needed to test new 
compounds on a large scale.  Thus, if a university starts the clinical trials, it is likely to 
do so because it has a potentially valuable compound.  In short, with universities, the 
type of projects in our sample might be biased in favour of the more successful projects.  
Clearly, our finding would not either be inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
universities have better capabilities as originators.  Ultimately, both factors probably 
contribute to the higher observed performance of the universities as originators.  
 
The finding about the NBFs and the large firms needs some further comment.  First, the 
results of the previous section showed that the large firms have higher absolute 
advantages downstream, while this section showed that they have no advantage as 
originators.  Thus, the large firms have higher comparative advantages in downstream 
innovation development. This also suggests that scale is important in drug development, 
while it is not important in drug discovery.  
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Second, the results in Table 6 do not account for possible differences between the NBFs 
and the large firms in different types of innovation projects.  Table 7 then reports the 
sample averages of the probability of success for the large firms and the NBFs in our 
three risk categories R1, R2, and R3.  We report the results for both the sample of the 
US firms running US-based clinical trials, and for the full sample.   
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 7 shows that the NBFs have no advantage in categories R2 and R3, but they do 
have an absolute advantage in R1.  Although not statistically significant, the point 
estimate indicates that in R1 the probability of success of a large US pharma in the US 
is about 0.10, while for an NBF it raises to 0.16.  For R2 and R3, large firms have 
probabilities of success equal to 0.08 and 0.04 respectively.  These probably are roughly 
the same for the NBFs.  The same applies if we look at the full sample, rather than the 
US firms in the US.  In the full sample, the difference between the large firms and the 
NBFs in R1 is even statistically significant.  As shown in section 4, NBFs also run 
relatively more projects in R1.  The NBFs are then consistently specialized in the areas 
where they also show comparatively better capabilities.   
 
 
8. FAILING AT EARLIER STAGES 
Finally, the advantages of the NBFs may not relate solely to the higher or lower 
probability of success of the drugs that they develop or originate.  In drug R&D, clinical 
trials can be very costly.  Hence, other things being equal, one would prefer to 
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discontinue a potentially bad project earlier rather than later.  We then check whether 
given that a project was discontinued, the NBFs tend to discontinue them at earlier 
rather than later stages.  
 
To do so, we restricted our sample to all the projects that were discontinued.  We 
constructed a variable DISC which takes the values 0, 1, 2 according to whether the 
project was discontinued in clinical I, II, or III.  As usual, we show the results for both 
US firms in US trials, and for the full sample which includes European firms and 
European trials as well.  Also, to focus on the NBFs vs large pharma comparison, we 
eliminated from our sample the projects originated by universities.  We run multinomial 
logit regressions using the following variables as regressors: risk dummies, dummy for 
NBFs as an originator; and for our full sample regressions we added a dummy for trials 
in the US.   The multinomial logit results are in Table 8.  Table 9 reports the implied 
changes in probabilities.  
 
TABLE 8 AND 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results show that the projects originated by the NBFs are more likely to be 
discontinued at earlier clinical stages.  As shown by Table 9, the probability that a 
project originated by an NBF is discontinued after clinicals I is about 0.22 higher than 
that of a large pharma; the probability that it is discontinued in clinicals I or II is about 
0.12 higher for an NBF (0.22-0.10).   One has to be careful in interpreting these results.  
As discussed earlier, a project that was discontinued may not be necessarily one that 
failed.  We know that it was discontinued by the company, and this might be because 
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the company could not raise the financial resources that were necessary to continue the 
trials.  Clearly, this problem is far more likely to occur for the NBFs than for the large 
pharmaceutical companies.13  This suggests that a potential source of bias is that the 
NBFs may discontinue projects earlier simply because they do not possess the necessary 
assets to continue the project rather than because the project actually failed. 
 
However, projects are normally discontinued because the company does not think that it 
has good prospects to pass the later stages.  An NBF is then more unlikely to 
discontinue a potentially good project.  Put differently, discontinued projects are in any 
case projects that have lower expected probabilities of success.  Thus, one fairly 
conclude that given our results in Tables 8 and 9, another potential advantage of the 
NBFs is that they can provide a good deal of exploration in drug research, as they 
produce information about potential compounds without engaging in the costly 
donwstream trials. 
 
Another hypothesis is that the greater ability of the NBFs to discontinue their projects 
earlier could stem from the nature of their underlying knowledge basis and technology.  
The life sciences are strongly rooted in scientific understanding of the biological 
phenomena.  This provides a predictive capabilities of the performance of new 
compounds without having to engage in long and costly tests.  Similarly, the new 
computerized drug screening technologies, and related techniques and devices typically 
used by the NBFs (e.g. combinatorial chemistry), provide a significant ability to 
“predict the failures”.  In short, the knowledge basis and technologies of the NBFs 
encourage the possibility of trying new molecules systematically and discover relatively 
                                                          
13 As noted in section 4, the problem is quite unlikely in the case of the large companies.  
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early whether they are potentially valuable or not, with implied potential for greater 
opportunities of exploration.  
 
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explored an unusually comprehensive data set of drug R&D projects all over 
the world.  Our data base enabled us to characterize several features of the potential for 
success of the innovation process in pharmaceuticals.  Since this industry is typically 
characterized by the role of both larger established companies, and smaller high-tech 
specialist firms  the so-called NBFs  our analysis enabled us to assess the different 
performance of R&D processes conducted under different governance structures  most 
notably projects that are fully internalized by the companies vis-à-vis projects 
developed in collaboration with other companies.  Moreover, our data enabled to assess 
the different specialization and the comparative performance of different types of firms, 
and particularly of the large drug companies with respect to the NBFs.  
 
Our results can be summarized as follows: 
a) The NBFs are largely an American phenomenon.  More than half of the drug R&D 
projects originated in the US are by NBFs, while almost 90% of the drug R&D 
projects originated in Europe are from established pharmaceutical firms; 
b) Collaborative R&D projects are consistently more likely to occur in the US than in 
Europe.  However, in-house projects are a significant majority of the drug R&D 
projects that entered the clinical stages.   
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c) The established pharmaceutical companies have comparative advantages with 
respect to NBFs in drug development (clinical trials). 
d) In drug discovery there is no advantage related to scale.  Unlike clinical 
developments, where the large firms seem to have superior capabilities when 
compared to the NBFs, there is no inherent superiority (in terms of ultimate 
probability of success of the compounds) between the NBFs and the large firms.  
e) The NBFs and the large firms do not seem to have differential capabilities in drug 
research in therapeutic classes that feature higher degree of risk (R2 and R3).  The 
NBFs however, have higher absolute capabilities in therapeutic classes with low 
levels of risk (R1).  Consistently, they have a higher share of projects in such 
therapeutic classes.   
f) The relatively higher share of NBF projects in R1, as opposed to R2 and R3, 
suggests that the NBFs do not undertake more risky projects (as noted for instance 
by the literature which suggests that smaller high-tech companies undertake more 
risky ventures).  More risky projects (R3) are more likely to be undertaken by the 
larger pharmaceutical companies, which suggests that scale, market power, and the 
ability to moblise large amounts of resources are key factors in enabling the firms to 
sustain such higher risks. 
g) Finally, other things being equal, the projects originated by the NBFs are more 
likely to fail at earlier clinical stages.  This suggests that the NBFs perform a good 
deal of exploration without incurring the higher costs of failing at later stages.  
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APPENDIX 
More on the “specializations” of the NBFs and the  
large pharmaceutical companies 
 
 
The ranking of ATC classes in terms of risk that was introduced in section 4 may be 
further controlled and specified by looking at an analogous classification used in 
Pharmaprojects (PJB Publications), one of the leading source of information on drugs in 
R&D. As a whole, Pharmaprojects contains detailed information over 25,000 
compounds and pharmaceutical formulations investigated since 1980, including those 
currently in research and those whose development has been discontinued.  In addition, 
Pharmaprojects profiles each therapeutic category by defining the pathology in medical 
terms and providing a review of current treatment, epidemiological and market data, and 
an analysis of therapeutic trends. For each therapeutic area Pharmaprojects provides 
also two synthetic indices: the Novelty (N) and Market Size (M) Ratings. 
 
On the one hand, the Novelty rating identifies the most advanced drug development 
strategies: highly innovative combinations of therapy and mechanisms of action 
received an high score, whereas the drug with a well-known strategy of action are low-
ranked.  On the other hand, the market size rating is based on the reported world wide 
sales for the primary therapeutic category.  
 
Table A1 reports the distribution of R&D projects among the NBFs, the large 
pharmaceutical companies and the Universities with respect to the Risk, Market Size 
and Novelty classifications.  The risk classification combines the novelty and the market 
size criteria used by Pharmaprojects.  NBFs show a higher degree of innovativeness 
than large pharmas as they tend to apply new mechanisms of pharmacological action 
especially to therapies for rare pathologies (e.g. Anemia, Gaucher Disease) and niche 
markets (Transplant rejection of specific organs). On the contrary, large pharmas tend to 
be active against “pathologies that affect the masses” in larger markets, characterized by 
complex clinical trials and more alternative therapeutic drugs already in the 
marketplace.  Table A2 reports the most important products awaiting approval to be 
launched on the US market for deseases that have the highest need of treatment.  With 
rare exceptions (Biomira’s Theratope, Vaxgen’s AIDSVAX) these products have been 
developed by large established pharmaceutical companies in-house or, less frequently, 
in collaboration with NBFs  (Xolair, Visudyne, SnET2). 
 
TABLES A1 AND A2 ABOUT HERE 
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Table 1: Percentage of Projects Originated by Established Pharma, NBFs, 
Universities; Percentage of Licensed Projects; Percentage of 
Successful Projects  
 
 Trials in the US/ 
Developer is a US 
company 
Trials in Europe/ 
Developer is a 
European company 
Originator: 
 
Large Pharmas 
 
NBFs 
 
Universities 
 
 
 
 
37.6% 
 
56.8% 
 
5.6% 
 
 
87.4% 
 
11.5% 
 
1.2% 
% of Licensed Projects 
 
7.5% 2.1% 
    By NBFs 
 
4.8% 1.7% 
 
    By Universities 
 
2.7% 0.4% 
 
% of Successful Projects 
 
 
9.5% 
 
11.0% 
 
N. of observations 
 
 
965 
 
776 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Number of Projects by NBFs, Large Pharma, Universities by classes 
of Risk, R1, R2, R3  Trials in the US/ US developers 
 
Classes of Risk 
 
Originators 
R1 R2 R3 Total 
 
NBFs 
 
 
147 
 
 
306 
 
95 
 
548 
 
Large Pharmas 
 
 
59 
 
203 
 
101 
 
363 
 
Universities 
 
 
8 
 
34 
 
12 
 
54 
 
Total 
 
 
214 
 
543 
 
208 
 
965 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Number of Projects by NBFs, Large Pharma, Universities by classes 
of Risk, R1, R2, R3  Full Sample 
 
Classes of Risk 
 
Originators 
R1 R2 R3 Total 
 
NBFs 
 
 
184 
 
 
394 
 
131 
 
709 
 
Large Pharmas 
 
 
223 
 
703 
 
348 
 
1274 
 
Universities 
 
 
15 
 
57 
 
23 
 
95 
 
Total 
 
 
422 
 
1154 
 
502 
 
2078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Probability of Success, Licensed vs In-house Projects (Standard 
errors in parenthesis) 
 
 US trials/ US 
developers 
Full Sample 
 
Prob.(Success | Compound licensed in Clinical I) 
 
 
22.0% 
(3.8) 
 
20.0 
(3.0) 
 
Prob.(Success | Internally developed compounds) 
 
 
6.5 
(0.9) 
 
8.8 
(0.7) 
 
 
Prob.(Success | Compound licensed in Clinical II) 
 
 
 
72.7 
(13.4) 
 
 
86.2 
(8.1) 
 
Prob.(Success | Internally developed compounds that 
passed clinicals I) 
 
 
26.5 
(3.1) 
 
26.4 
(1.8) 
 
 
 
Prob.(Success | Compound licensed in Clinical III) 
 
 
 
73.3 
(12.7) 
 
 
73.3 
(7.2) 
 
Prob.(Success | Internally developed compounds that 
passed clinicals I and II) 
 
 
41.5 
(4.2) 
 
40.9 
(2.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Assessing Development Capabilities, Probit Estimation  Dependent 
Variable: SUCC = 1 for successful projects, 0 otherwise 
 (Sample = only licensed projects; standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
 US trials/US Developers US or EU trials/ US or EU 
Developers 
  
Estimated 
parameter 
 
Change in 
Probability 
 
Estimated 
Parameter 
 
Change in 
Probability 
 
Const. 
 
 
Dummy for R2 
 
 
Dummy for R3 
 
 
Dummy for 
Large Pharma 
 
Dummy for 
trials in the US 
 
 
N.of obs. 
 
 
 
-0.08 
(0.37) 
 
-0.45 
(0.40) 
 
-1.30 
(0.50) 
 
0.77 
(0.32) 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
-0.03 
 
 
-0.15 
 
 
-0.43 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
 
 
0.42 
(0.33) 
 
-0.33 
(0.26) 
 
-0.89 
(0.30) 
 
0.42 
(0.23) 
 
-0.56 
(0.24) 
 
 
164 
 
0.15 
 
 
-0.12 
 
 
-0.32 
 
 
0.15 
 
 
-0.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Assessing Originators Capabilities, Probit Estimation  Dependent 
Variable: SUCC = 1 for successful projects, 0 otherwise 
 (Standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
 US trials/US Developers US or EU trials/ US or EU 
Developers 
 
 Estim. 
Param. 
 
Change 
in Prob. 
Estim. 
Param.
Change 
in Prob.
Estim. 
Param.
Change 
in Prob.
Estim. 
Param. 
Change 
in Prob.
 
Const. 
 
 
Dummy for 
R2 
 
Dummy for 
R3 
 
Dummy for 
Originator = 
University  
 
Dummy for 
Originator = 
NBF  
 
Dummy for 
trials in the 
US 
 
 
N.of obs. 
 
 
-1.12 
(0.14) 
 
-0.31 
(0.13) 
 
-0.67 
(0.19) 
 
0.83 
(0.29) 
 
 
0.05 
(0.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
936 
 
-0.18 
 
 
-0.03 
 
 
-0.10 
 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.11 
(0.14) 
 
-0.32 
(0.14) 
 
-0.66 
(0.20) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.05 
(0.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
910 
 
-0.17 
 
 
-0.05 
 
 
-0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.99 
(0.09) 
 
-0.16 
(0.09) 
 
-0.49 
(0.12) 
 
0.88 
(0.18) 
 
 
0.12 
(0.09) 
 
 
-0.15 
(0.08) 
 
 
 
2036 
 
 
-0.19 
 
 
-0.03 
 
 
-0.09 
 
 
0.17 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
 
-0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.99 
(0.09) 
 
-0.15 
(0.08) 
 
-0.52 
(0.12) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.12 
(0.09) 
 
 
-0.14 
(0.08) 
 
 
 
1981 
 
-0.19 
 
 
-0.03 
 
 
-0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
 
-0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Assessing Originators Capabilities, by Risk Category (OLSQ 
Estimation)  (Standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
 US trials/US Developers US or EU trials/ US or EU 
Developers 
 
 R1 R2 R3 R1 R2 R3 
 
Const. 
 
 
Dummy for 
Originator = NBF  
 
Dummy for trials in 
the US 
 
 
N.of obs. 
 
 
0.10 
(0.05) 
 
0.06 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
205 
 
0.08 
(0.02) 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
509 
 
0.04 
(0.02) 
 
0.00 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
 
0.13 
(0.03) 
 
0.09 
(0.04) 
 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
 
 
405 
 
0.13 
(0.02) 
 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
 
 
1097 
 
0.08 
(0.02) 
 
0.02 
(0.03) 
 
-0.05 
(0.02) 
 
 
479 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Multinomial logit, Dependent Variable: DISC = 0, 1, 2 for projects 
discontinued in clinicals I, II, III. Sample = Discontinued Projects 
(Standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
 US trials/US 
Developers 
US or EU trials/ US or 
EU Developers 
 
 
1st set of Parameters: Differences b/w 
DISC=1 and baseline case DISC=0 
 
Const. 
 
 
Dummy for R2 
 
 
Dummy for R3 
 
 
Dummy for Originator = NBF  
 
 
Dummy for trials in the US 
 
 
2nd set of Parameters: Differences b/w 
DISC=2 and baseline case DISC=0 
 
Const. 
 
 
Dummy for R2 
 
 
Dummy for R3 
 
 
Dummy for Originator = NBF  
 
 
Dummy for trials in the US 
 
 
 
N.of obs. 
of which 
    DISC=0 
    DISC=1 
    DISC=2 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.10 
(0.29) 
 
-0.22 
(0.30) 
 
-1.01 
(0.41) 
 
-1.48 
(0.26) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.83 
(0.27) 
 
-0.66 
(0.30) 
 
-0.60 
(0.34) 
 
-1.64 
(0.26) 
 
 
 
 
 
832 
 
672 
78 
82 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.04 
(0.18) 
 
-0.21 
(0.19) 
 
-0.29 
(0.22) 
 
-1.15 
(0.20) 
 
-0.37 
(0.16) 
 
 
 
 
-0.82 
(0.17) 
 
-0.58 
(0.18) 
 
-0.45 
(0.20) 
 
-1.52 
(0.21) 
 
-0.05 
(0.15) 
 
 
1759 
 
1292 
225 
242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Estimated Changes in Probabilities for NBF as Originators from the 
Multinomial logit Model in Table 8 (Change in Probability of failing 
at Stage I, II, III given that Project was originated by an NBF) 
 
 
 
 
 
Stage of Project Discontinuation 
 
 
US trials/US 
Developers 
 
US or EU trials/ US 
or EU Developers 
 
 
Clinicals I 
 
 
Clinicals II 
 
 
Clinicals III 
 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
-0.10 
 
 
-0.12 
 
0.24 
 
 
-0.09 
 
 
-0.15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A1: Share of projects by NBFs and large pharmas according to Risk, 
Market Size of the potential compounds, Novelty of the chemical 
structure of the molecule.  
 
 
 
 Low Medium High 
Risk 25,95 55,57 18,48 
Market Size 43,23 43,75 13,02 
NBFs 
Novelty 37,10 52,93 9,97 
Risk 17,50 55,18 27,32 
Market Size 37,47 45,27 17,26 
Large Pharma 
Novelty 42,05 50,71 7,24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: The most important programs in late-stage development (Phase III 
and Awaiting Approval). FDA Clinical Trials, Oct. 2000 
 
Market Product 
Name 
Description Developers Development 
Strategy 
Novelty 
Theratope Therapeutic vaccine for 
metastatic brest cancer 
Biomira Inc. Established 
Faslodex Advanced brest cancer AstraZeneca 2nd, 3rd or 4th  
Compound 
Anticancer 
Arzoxifene Selective estrogen 
modulator 
Eli Lilly & Co. 2nd, 3rd or 4th  
Compound 
Xolair First anti-immunoglobulin E 
(IgE) for asthma and 
rhinitis 
Novartis, 
Genentech, 
Tanox Inc. 
Leading 
Advair Diskus Antiasthma Glaxo Wellcome New 
Formulation 
Respiratory 
Asmanex Antiasthma Schering-Plough 
Co. 
Established 
Cardiovascular Vanlev Antihypertensive Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
Leading 
Ketek The first in a new family of 
antibiotics called ketolides 
Aventis Leading 
Cancidas Antifungal 
antipneumocystic agent 
Merck & Co. Established 
Factive inhibitor of topoisomerases 
I and IV 
SmithKline 
Beecham 
Leading 
Bacterial 
infections 
Spectracef orally-active 3rd-generation 
cephalosporin 
TAP 
Pharmaceutical 
Established 
 
Depression Vestra inhibits norepinephrine 
reuptake and blocks 
Alpha2-receptors 
Pharmacia Corp. Leading 
Nexium the first proton pump 
inhibitor developed as an 
isomer 
AstraZeneca Leading Gastrointestinal  
Zelmac irritable bowel syndrome Novartis 2nd, 3rd or 4th  
Compound 
ALX1-11 recombinant parathyroid 
hormones 
NPS 
Pharmaceuticals 
Leading Osteoporosis 
Forteo recombinant parathyroid 
hormones 
Eli Lilly & Co. New 
Formulation 
Memantine glaucoma Allergan Inc. Leading 
Xalcom open-angle glaucoma Pharmacia Corp. Established 
Visudyne age-related macular 
degeneration 
QLT Inc., 
Novartis 
Leading 
Ophthalmic 
SnET2 age-related macular 
degeneration 
Miravant Medical 
Technologies, 
Pharmacia 
2nd, 3rd or 4th  
Compound 
Glucophage antidiabetic  Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
New 
Formulation 
Diabetes 
Starlix type-2 diabetes Novartis Leading 
Trizivir combination of Epivir, 
Ziagen, and Retrovir 
Glaxo Wellcome New 
Formulation 
AIDS 
Aidsvax preventive vaccine VaxGen Inc. Established 
 
 
